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I Introduction 
According to estimates1, earnings restatements that took place between January 
1997 and June 2002 caused at least $100 billion erosion in shareholders’ value. The 
number of earnings restatements increased dramatically in the past few years, and this 
trend is expected to continue. Wu (2002) reports 220 restatements between 1994- 1997, 
and 616 between 1998- 2001. The increasing number and the magnitude of earnings 
restatements cause significant concerns among investors, as well as among litigators. In a 
Senate floor statement Senator Paul S. Sarbanes addressed the issue2: “It is becoming 
increasingly clear that something has gone wrong, seriously wrong, with respect to our 
capital markets. We confront an increasing crisis of confidence that is eroding the 
public's trust in those markets. I frankly believe that, if it continues, this erosion of trust 
poses a real threat to our economic health. Let me begin with one of the most obvious 
symptoms of this problem: the extraordinary increase in restatements of corporate 
earnings.”  
Restating financial data often results in adverse consequences for the restating 
firm. The information revealed may dramatically change the profile of the firm in the 
eyes of investors, and indeed a number of studies report significant negative abnormal 
stock reaction to the announcement of earnings restatements. In addition, restating firms 
can be faced with costly litigation expenses as they are sued for falsifying their 
statements and misleading their shareholders, and with the loss of investors’ confidence, 
which may affect their stock prices long after the actual restatement. 
The information revealed in a variety of corporate announcements has been 
shown to trigger abnormal returns not only for the announcing firm, but also for industry 
                                                 
1 Matt Krantz in USA Today (10/24/2002) sites a study by the US General Accounting Office 
2 Senator Sarbanes initiated the public company accounting reform and investor protection act of 2002.  
The speech was given in front of the president on July 8th, 2002. 
rival firms. An abnormal movement in the stock price of non-announcing firms which is 
in the same direction as the movement in the stock price of the announcing firm is usually 
referred to as a ‘contagion effect’, while a price movement in the opposite direction is 
called a ‘competitive effect’. The contagion effect is usually explained by the fact that the 
information revealed by a firm contains previously unavailable information on the firm’s 
industry as a whole, thus eliciting the same direction price movement. The existence of a 
competitive effect can be explained by the fact that the information revealed is firm 
specific but investors believe that rival firms stand to loose ground or gain, depending 
upon whether the announcing firm has revealed favorable or unfavorable news. The 
effect of an announcement on competitors can be viewed as the sum of the contagion and 
competitive effects. 
Announcements of reduced earning restatements can be viewed as firm specific, 
revealing the truth about the firm’s financials, weakening its ability to compete and 
exposing it to liability charges. If, however, earnings restatements are a symptom of a 
wider problem, either a crisis of confidence in the industry or an industry wide 
fundamental problem, there may also be a negative reaction in competitors’ stock prices. 
The negative reaction might be particularly large for restatements which are viewed as 
conveying fraudulent behavior, i.e., when there is potential for a class action lawsuit.   
 In this paper, we examine whether the information conveyed by corrective 
disclosures transfers to other firms within the same industry, thereby eliciting abnormal 
price movements in industry-wide stock prices. We specifically choose restatements that 
later led to a lawsuit to ensure the significance of the event. To test this “contagion 
hypothesis”, we measure abnormal returns on industry portfolios around the day of the 
announcement, and perform a multivariate regression in order to identify some of the 
factors that explain the magnitude of the portfolios abnormal return.  
Our results indicate that, in the case of allegedly fraudulent restatements, there is, 
on average, a significant negative abnormal return for industry rivals of the announcing 
firm around the announcement day. This result may indicate that the confidence in the 
industry is harmed due to the suspicion of fraudulent behavior in the announcing firm.  
We find that the magnitude of the abnormal return can partially be explained by the 
magnitude of the consequences of the announcement – represented by the size of the 
settlement fund agreed upon by the court, and by the number of firms in the industry 
portfolio. Also, we find that the magnitude of the negative abnormal returns declines as a 
function of time, indicating that similar restatements affect industry rivals less in later 
years. This is a particularly interesting finding. It may be that as investors get used to 
more earnings restatements, the expectations for additional revelations are factored into 
stock prices, thus making an actual announcement less of a shock. Last, we find that in 
cases in which the announcing firm is less dominant in its industry, and the industry is 
not concentrated, the contagion effect is smaller than in other cases.   
 
II Prior Research 
II.1 Earnings Restatements 
Prior research on earnings restatements is limited (Palmrose et al, 2002). In recent 
years, however, probably due to the growing number of restatements and their 
magnitude, and the rising concerns around them, the body of literature was enriched by 
several papers. Most papers find earnings restatements to be a costly event for the 
restating firm.  A negative stock price reaction on or around the announcement day is 
reported, for example, by Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2002), who find a mean 
decline of 9.2% over a two day window, and by Richardson et al. (2002), who record an 
11% decline over a three day period. In addition, restating firms are more likely to be 
subject to costly class action suits (Jones and Weingram, 1997). 
 A significant portion of the restatement literature is related to fraud and class 
action lawsuits. This is understandable, since restatements that lead to litigation are 
usually the ones that have a bigger impact on shareholders’ value. When a restatement of 
earnings does lead to litigation, the market’s reaction is harsher. Ferris and Pritchard 
(2001) report a negative reaction on the order of 25% over a three-day period surrounding 
the revelation of restatements that led to class action suits, and Francis et al. (1994) 
similarly find a 17.2% decline on the announcement day. These results, however, are not 
surprising. It is reasonable to assume that the cause for the later litigation is the 
magnitude of the negative stock reaction, implying that these results may be due to 
reverse causation. Griffin et al. (2000) find a smaller, but still significant, negative 
reaction to the announcement that the restating firm is subject to a class action lawsuit, 
and a negative drift between the two announcements.  
II.2 Contagion Effect and Competitive Effect 
The existence of a ‘contagion effect’ has been well documented around a variety 
of corporate events such as bankruptcy announcements (Lang and Stulz, 1992); dividend 
announcements (Laux, Starks and Yoon, 1998); earnings releases (Foster, 1981), and 
stock split announcements (Tawatnuntachai and D’Mello, 2002). The common 
explanation for contagion effect is that homogeneity of firms within an industry causes 
the market to revise the value of non-announcing firms in the same direction as the 
announcing firm’s stock movement3.  
The ‘competitive effect’ has also been found in relation to several corporate 
events. Depending on the degree of industry concentration and on leverage, Lang and 
Stulz (1992) found evidence of abnormal positive returns for rival industry firms in the 
case of bankruptcy announcements. They argue that new information released by a 
company may cause investors to re-evaluate the competitive landscape of the industry.  
 
III Sample and Data Selection 
A proprietary database of settlements in class action suit cases is the source for 
the earnings restatement cases. The cases had to satisfy three criteria: the lawsuit was a 
result of an earnings restatement; the database has complete filings of the class action 
suit; and CRSP has the stock price for the filing firm. My final data consists of 34 cases 
of earnings restatements which led to class action suits that were settled between1996 – 
2001. Using the class action settlements database insures that each of the earnings 
restatements was significant enough to elicit a class action lawsuit. The reason for the 
focus on these cases is twofold: the first reason is that, presumably4, only a significant 
firm specific event will potentially have an industry wide effect. The second reason for 
using the settlements database is that it raises the issue of whether mistrust in disclosure 
practices is contagious.  
Consistent with prior research, I find a significant mean abnormal return of -
17.75% on the announcement day, -11.55% on the day following the announcement, and 
-33.51% over a five-day window (days -2 to 2). The existence of a large negative 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Szewczyk (1992). 
4 See, for instance, Lang and Stulz (1992). 
abnormal return on the day following the announcement can be explained by the fact that 
in some cases the announcement is made at the end of the trading day, in which case the 
market’s reaction will be delayed until the next business day. In some cases, after an 
earnings restatement announcement is made, trading is suspended in the announcing 
firm’s stock, sometimes for more then a day. Since the focus of this paper is the industry 
portfolios’ reaction to the announcements rather than to the movement of the announcing 
firm’s stock, we include all cases in our research. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics 
of the restatement announcement events used in this study.   
For each case, industry portfolios are constructed from all firms with the same 
six-digit NAICS code that are listed in Compustat and have stock prices in CRSP. In 
1997, The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) has replaced the U.S. 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system as the major system of classifying 
industries. According to the U.S Census Bureau, it responds to increasing and serious 
criticism about the former SIC system, and better reflects the structure of today's 
economy in the United States. The 34 cases represent only 25 different NAICS 
classifications, since 9 of the cases occurred within the same industry, and 2 cases 
occurred in another industry. Returns on announcing firm securities, industry portfolios 
and market portfolios were collected from CRSP.   
 
 
Table 1: Announcing firms’ abnormal returns around announcement day (data in 
percentage, a bold figure indicates statistical significance at the 0.05% level, a star (*) indicates no return 
for the stock, usually the result of trading halt). 
 
     Abnormal Return    
Case  Ticker   Restatement date  -2 -1 0 1 2 Cumulative 
ADAC Laboratories  ADAC  1-Mar-99 2.63 1.73 -20.36 -9.57 -2.8 -26.91 
BT Office Products  BTF 28-Mar-96 -1.22 -1.02 -1.41 -26.37 -6.55 -33.67 
Centennial Technologies, Inc. CENL 11-Feb-97 -8.84 -12.17 * * * -19.93 
CHS Electronics  CHSEHS  22-Mar-99 -17.43 3.32 -33.5 3.53 -1.74 -42.29 
Craig Consumer Electronics   CREG  10-Mar-97 0.35 -0.09 -26 0.45 -26.55 -45.26 
Datastream Systems  DSTM  20-Oct-98 -2.34 0.09 -1.57 -31.62 0.07 -34.16 
Del Global Technologies  DGTC  6-Nov-00 -0.76 -1.01 0.67 * * -1.10 
Dollar General Corporation  DG  30-Apr-01 -1.03 4.13 -31.67 -5.28 -1.88 -34.55 
Donnkenny, Inc.  DNKY  7-Nov-96 -2.84 -1.76 -29.34 11.01 -0.16 -25.25 
Health Management, Inc HMIS 27-Feb-96 -34.39 -15.38 -45.46 8.61 -0.59 -67.31 
Identix, Inc. IDX 26-Aug-96 0.68 -4.99 5.64 -6.95 -0.52 -6.46 
Indus International  IINT  27-Jan-00 -2.39 2.82 4.75 -19.8 0.38 -15.37 
Informix Corp.  IFMX  1-Apr-97 1.58 2.92 -32.53 -6.38 0.12 -33.88 
Insignia Solutions INSGY 27-Feb-97 1.31 -1.72 -33.6 4.49 -6.55 -35.44 
Inso Corporation  INSO  1-Feb-99 -0.89 -1.84 -62.26 -13.48 6.85 -66.06 
Mercury Finance MFN 29-Jan-97 -1.84 -1.9 1.93 -0.166 -32.328 -33.69 
Micro Warehouse, Inc. MWHS 30-Sep-96 0.97 -2.08 -18.65 -7.83 -3.04 -28.12 
Motorcar Parts & Accessories,  MPAA  1-Aug-99 -3.13 -1.81 * * * -4.88 
Network Associates, Inc.  NETA  6-Apr-99 -0.08 -4.43 -24.74 -27.08 -8.68 -52.14 
Network Computing Devices, In NCDI 31-Jan-96 1.04 4.08 -3.52 -18.7 -2.88 -19.89 
Nuko Information Systems  NUKO  21-May-97 1.34 -7.94 -32.53 -5.21 -3.28 -42.29 
Pegasystems I  PEGA  29-Oct-97 4.41 4.64 -3.69 -30.5 -3.38 -29.34 
Peoplesoft, Inc  PSFT  28-Jan-99 0.82 -5.3 -1.5 -12.9 -4.91 -22.11 
Pepsi-Cola P.R. Bottling Co. PPO 12-Aug-96 -1.73 -7.52 -18.39 -6.67 10.88 -23.25 
 Photran Corporation   PTRN  5-May-97 -8.6 -1.12 6.22 -6.28 -13.56 -22.23 
 Raster Graphics   RGFX  3-Feb-98 -0.19 0.59 -1.36 -43.21 13.6 -36.11 
Rite Aid Corporation  RAD  12-Mar-99 -4.01 -3.03 -39.03 8.92 0.61 -37.81 
SCB Computer Technology, Inc.  SCBI  14-Apr-00 -5 -2.61 0.93 * * -6.62 
Southwall Technologies  SWTX  6-Aug-00 -1.1 -6.87 -9.18 * * -16.35 
Sybase  SYBS  21-Jan-98 -3.68 3.55 3.53 -18.47 -1.03 -16.68 
Unify Corporation  UNFY  21-Jul-99 -3.72 -4.3 * * * -7.86 
Unison Healthcare Corporation  UNHC  11-Mar-97 -1.78 -1.78 -45.48 -13.28 -6.85 -57.51 
Vesta Insurance Group, Inc.  VTA  1-Jun-98 0.19 0.06 * -46.32 2.89 -44.63 
Vista 2000, Inc. VIST 8-Apr-96 5.19 -28.01 -40.45 -4.34 -10.41 -61.35 
         
Average   -2.54 -2.67 -17.75 -11.55 -3.6531 -33.51 
 
 
 
IV Hypothesis and Methodology  
IV.1 Event Study 
Research has shown that some firm specific events elicit abnormal price 
movements not only in the stock of the firm itself, but also in the price of its industry 
peers. In order to investigate whether this is the case when firms announce earnings 
restatements, we confirm, first, that announcing firms experience negative abnormal 
returns around the day of the announcement. That is a prerequisite for any contagion 
effect, but in the case of our sample it was almost redundant, since it is unlikely that our 
sample firms would have been sued unless they had experienced significant negative 
returns in their stock prices.  
Next, we compute the abnormal returns for the industry portfolios around the 
event day, after removing the announcing firm from the portfolio. Since we expect the 
contagion effect to be greater than any competitive effect there might be, the overall 
effect on the industry portfolios should be negative. Our hypothesis, thus, is: 
H1: the return of the industry portfolio around the announcement day is abnormally 
negative. 
Betas and Alphas for firms and portfolios are estimated in a standard OLS 
regression against the CRSP equally weighted portfolio (a proxy for the market 
portfolio), using 255 daily returns, ending 35 days prior to the event day. Firms that have 
less then 14 useable daily returns are dropped from the sample. Abnormal returns are 
then estimated according to standard market adjusted method: The abnormal return on a 
given day t, for security or portfolio j, is calculated in the following way: 
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IV.2 Abnormal Returns and Industry and Firm Characteristics 
 To assess industry and firm specific factors that influence the magnitude of 
industry portfolios’ abnormal return, we divide our sample according to the following 
variables:  
1) Settlement Fund (log fund): We use the log of the settlement fund as a proxy for 
the estimated damage inflicted by the earnings restatement to the announcing 
firm’s shareholders. According to Simmons (2002), the estimate of plaintiff-style 
damages is the single most powerful predictor of settlement value. Estimate of 
damages, presumably, should be correlated with the magnitude of the industry 
portfolios’ abnormal returns. According to Lang and Stulz (1992), in cases of 
bankruptcies the total value lost by the industry rivals is highly correlated to the 
value lost by the bankrupt firm. We expect higher settlement funds to be 
correlated with higher negative returns for the industry portfolios. 
2) HHI: the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is an accepted measure of industry 
concentration level. We calculate HHI by summing the squared market share, 
approximated by market capitalization, of all portfolio firms. The degree of 
concentration is higher for industries with higher HHI. Tawathuntachai and 
D’Mello (2002) find the intra-industry contagion effect in cases of stock split 
announcements to be smaller for industries with higher HHI. Lang and Stulz 
(1992) argue that in highly concentrated industries the competition between firms 
is more intense, and thus the competitive effect is more dominant than the 
contagion effect. Accordingly, we expect lower HHI to be correlated with lower 
abnormal returns for the industry portfolio.    
3) Dominance of announcing firm (% market cap): we use the size of the 
announcing firm, in terms of market capitalization, and as a percent of the total 
market capitalization of the industry portfolio, as a proxy for its dominance its 
industry. An announcement from a more dominant firm that implies irregularities 
in the accounting standards may arguably signal to investors that the accounting 
practices of the industry are flawed. We expect firms which constitute a higher 
percentage of the industry to have more influence over the industry portfolio.   
 
We perform a series of weighted least squares regressions to further analyze the 
effect of the factors which determine the magnitude of the industry portfolios’ abnormal 
returns. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return on a portfolio over a 
three day period (days -1, 0, and 1), while the independent variables, in addition to the 
factors mentioned above, are the logged number of firms in a portfolio and the date.  
The number of firms is a control variable that ensures the same treatment for 
different portfolios. It is likely that larger portfolios will experience smaller returns, albeit 
as significant, than smaller portfolios. The ‘number of firms’ variable is logged, to cap 
the influence of very large portfolios. We expect higher negative abnormal returns to be 
correlated with a smaller number of firms in a portfolio.  
For the date variable, we list the announcement days on a time scale, where the 
first event is 1, and the number generated for each subsequent event is the number of 
days that elapsed since the first event. As earnings restatements become more prevalent, 
we expect their impact on industry portfolios (and on the market as a whole) to decrease 
in magnitude, since supposedly investors factor into their valuations the increased risk of 
fraud or accounting irregularities. This trend was demonstrated in October 2002, when 
shares of AOL Time Warner, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Tyco rose after earnings were 
restated. We expect, thus, to find the magnitude of abnormal returns for industry rivals 
smaller as time passes. 
Following Lang and Stulz (1992) we use weights equal to reciprocal of the 
standard deviation of the market model residual for the industry portfolios. Weighting by 
residual standard deviation of portfolio returns means we are down-weighting portfolios 
that have higher percentage variability. That helps to eliminate the non-constant variance 
we encounter when dealing with portfolios of different sizes and different variances. 
V Empirical Results 
V.1 Event Study 
 We find a highly significant (at the 0.1% level) abnormal negative return for the 
industry of -0.75% (t = -3.226) on the day of the restatement, and of -0.79% (t = -3.418) 
on the following day. Figure 1 portrays daily average abnormal returns on the 11day 
window surrounding the announcement, and table 2 summarizes the daily average results. 
The cumulative abnormal return for those two days is -1.54% (t = -4.698), while the 
cumulative abnormal return for the three-day window (day -1 to 1) is -1.74% (t = -4.335). 
The cumulative mean abnormal returns for the 11day window are shown in figure 2. 
Twenty-eight of the 34 portfolios experience a negative return on the day of the 
announcement (a generalized sign Z test proves this to be statistically significant (z = -
3.877)), and 25 experience a negative cumulative return on the 3 day window consisting 
of days -1, 0 and 1 (z = -2.848). In 12 portfolios, the negative abnormal return is 
statistically significant on day 0, the 2 day window (0 and 1) and/or the 3 day 
 window (-1, 0, 1). The results are summarized in tables 2 and 3, and shown graphically 
in figures 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Industry portfolios’ mean abnormal returns around announcement day (the 
generalized sign Z tests the significance of the difference between positive and negative returns on a 
certain day). 
Market Model, Equally Weighted Index 
                                 Mean         Positive/                   Generalized 
         Day       N       Return       Negative          t            Sign Z 
         -10      34           0.16%      14:20          0.685          -1.133    
          -9      34           0.24%       15:19          1.054          -0.790    
          -8      34           0.12%       14:20          0.518          -1.133    
          -7      34          -0.05%       20:14         -0.232          0.926    
          -6      34          -0.30%       14:20         -1.282         -1.133    
          -5      34          -0.12%       16:18         -0.523         -0.447    
          -4      34           0.40%       18:16          1.709*         0.240    
          -3      34          -0.34%       18:16         -1.460$        0.240    
          -2      34           0.35%       17:17          1.503$        -0.104    
          -1      34          -0.20%       17:17         -0.864         -0.104    
          0       34          -0.75%         6:28         -3.226***     -3.877*** 
          +1      34          -0.79%      11:23         -3.418***     -2.162*   
          +2      34          -0.14%      17:17         -0.614         -0.104    
          +3      34          -0.02%      17:17         -0.065         -0.104    
          +4      34          -0.03%      19:15         -0.119          0.583    
          +5      34           0.35%      16:18          1.513$        -0.447    
          +6      34          -0.22%      11:23         -0.953         -2.162*   
          +7      34           0.00%      17:17          0.003          -0.104    
          +8      34           0.44%      24:10          1.893*          2.298*   
          +9      34           0.02%      17:17          0.078          -0.104    
         +10      34          0.11%      18:16          0.470           0.240    
The symbols $,*,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, using a 1-tail test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean daily industry portfolios’ abnormal returns around announcement day (data 
in percentage, 0 is announcement day). 
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Figure 2: Mean daily industry portfolios’ abnormal returns around announcement day (data 
in percentage, 0 is announcement day). 
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 Table 3: Industry portfolios’ mean abnormal returns around announcement day (the 
generalized sign Z tests the significance of the difference between positive and negative returns on a 
certain day). 
       Abnormal Return        
Case 
No. 
Firms -2 -1 0 1 2 
Cum  
0,1 Cum -1, 0, 1 
ADAC LABORATORIES  13 1.53 0.23 -1.52 0.98 1.17 -0.54 -0.32 
B T OFFICE PRODUCTS INTL 6 -1.3 -1.3 -0.01 -0.75 -1.5 -0.76 -2.07 
C H S ELECTRONICS 27 -1.44 -1.49 -1.31 0.95 0.5 -0.36 -1.85 
CENTENNIAL 57 0.03 -1.1 -3.19 -0.32 -0.9 -3.51 -4.61 
CRAIG CONSUMER ELECTR 23 -0.78 -0.71 -0.45 0.07 
-
0.061 -0.38 -1.09 
DATASTREAM SYSTEMS INC 281 0.9 -0.25 -0.33 0.46 0.12 0.13 -0.12 
DEL GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES 
CORP 10 -0.41 2.02 -0.11 -0.84 1.84 -0.95 1.06 
DOLLAR GENERAL CORP 16 2.06 0.13 -0.45 0.78 1.2 0.33 0.46 
DONNKENNY INC 4 -3.38 -0.96 0.99 -2.05 -1.46 -1.06 -2.01 
HEALTH MANAGEMENT INC DEL 19 -0.55 -0.57 0.65 -0.42 -1.74 0.23 -0.034 
IDENTIX INC 105 -0.28 -1.31 -0.38 0.03 0.55 -0.446 -1.566 
INDUS INTERNATIONAL 324 0.55 -0.75 -0.27 -1.81 -1.89 -2.11 -2.87 
INFORMIX CORP 286 0.71 0.91 -0.45 -0.35 -0.04 -0.78 0.14 
INSIGNIA SOLUTIONS PLC 5 -0.99 0.02 -1.18 -2.99 -1.49 -4.16 -4.14 
INSO CORP 279 -0.18 -1.42 0.04 -0.89 1.63 -0.85 -2.195 
Mercury Finance 24 1.16 -1.04 -2.8 -6.44 0.55 -9.24 -10.28 
MICRO WAREHOUSE INC 30 -0.36 0.46 -0.96 0.15 -0.3 -0.53 -0.17 
MOTORCAR PARTS & 
ACCESSORIES 5 0.19 3.02 -2.05 0.04 0.04 -2 1.01 
NETWORK COMPUTING DEVICES 7 -0.62 -2.78 0.38 -1.33 0.43 -0.9 -3.69 
NETWORKS ASSOCIATES 284 6.53 3.34 -4.05 -3.8 -1.97 -7.85 -4.52 
NUKO INFORMATION SYSTEMS 76 -0.19 0.26 -0.18 0.05 -0.22 -0.12 0.13 
PEGASYSTEMS INC 300 2.02 1.29 -0.24 -0.05 -0.23 -0.3 1.02 
PEOPLESOFT INC 278 0.14 -0.18 -1.37 0.06 -0.9 -1.31 -1.49 
PEPSI COLA P R BOTTLING CO 10 -0.2 -2.72 -1.68 -1.08 0.86 -2.76 -5.53 
PHOTRAN CORP 3 2.4 -5.02 -0.5 -2.86 0.57 -3.36 -8.38 
RASTER GRAPHICS INC 55 -0.36 0.28 -0.61 -0.35 -0.28 -1.037 -0.596 
RITE AID CORP 12 -0.84 0.95 -2.63 -4.43 0.65 -7.06 -6.1 
S C B COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 30 1.63 0.92 0.32 1.49 -1.36 1.81 2.73 
SOUTHWALL TECHNOLOGIES  5 0.22 0.37 -0.62 -1.06 0.47 -1.68 -1.31 
SYBASE INC 297 -1.14 0.22 -0.16 0.71 -0.1 0.5 0.72 
UNIFY CORP 341 0.14 -0.75 -1.09 -0.17 0.61 -1.18 -1.99 
UNISON HEALTHCARE CORP 17 -0.62 1.23 1.3 -0.06 0.01 1.24 2.47 
VESTA INSURANCE GROUP 105 0.49 0.27 -0.37 -0.07 -0.09 -0.45 -0.18 
VISTA 2 4.22 -0.1 -0.25 -0.66 -1.1 -0.91 -1.02 
Average 98.12 0.33 -0.19 -0.75 -0.79 -0.13 -1.54 -1.72 
 
 
 
 
 
V.2 Abnormal Returns and Industry and Firm Characteristics 
 We find industry portfolios’ abnormal return to be more negative for 
announcements that result in large settlement funds. The average abnormal return for the 
subsample of ‘large fund’ is -2.38%, which is significantly larger in absolute value than 
the average for ‘small fund’ sub sample, which is -0.86 (T = -1.77, p = 0.085).  
 The average abnormal return for industries in which the announcing firm 
constitutes a large percentage of the market share is more negative than for other firms     
( -2.49% as opposed to -1.15%), but this difference is not statistically significant. 
 We find no significant difference between abnormal returns when dividing the 
sample by small and large HHI values.  
 We find a significant interaction effect for two smaller sub samples: the average 
abnormal returns for a sub sample that consists of cases with ‘low percentage market cap’ 
and ‘low HHI’ is -0.27%, while the average for the rest of the sample is -2.43% (T = 
2.51, p = 0.017).  The average for a sub sample that consists of cases with ‘low 
percentage’ and ‘low fund” is -2.27%, while the average for the rest of the sample is -
0.56% (T = 1.92, p = 0.064).  
These results are summarized in table 5. 
Table 5: Industry portfolios’ mean abnormal returns for different subsamples around 
announcement day (cumulative return on days -1, 0, 1) 
Industry and Firm 
Characteristics 
Average 
abnormal 
returns for 
subsample 
Average 
abnormal 
returns for 
rest of 
sample   
T statistic 
of two 
sample T 
test 
p value 
Settlement fund above 
mean 
-2.38% -0.86% -1.77 0.085 
Firm dominance (% 
market share of 
portfolio) above median 
-2.21% -1.12% -1.25 0.221 
Fund high, dominance 
high 
-2.27% -0.56% 1.92 0.064 
Dominance low, HHI 
low 
-2.43% -0.27% 2.51 0.017 
 
A weighted least squares regression analysis containing all variables shows two of 
the variables as significant. The adjusted R-Sq of the regression is 14.3%, and the model 
has statistical significance (p = 0.095, F = 2.1). Figure 3 shows the regression output.   
According to the model, portfolio returns will be more negative the larger the 
settlement fund size is (p = 0.054, T = -2.01). Since the size of the fund is highly 
correlated with the estimated dollar loss to shareholders, it is safe to assume that the 
portfolio loss is affected by the value loss of the restating firm. The result is consistent 
with the finding by Lang and Stulz (1992), who studied contagion effect in cases of 
bankruptcy announcement. They found the dollar loss of the bankrupt firm to be roughly 
equivalent on average to the dollar loss of the industry portfolio. 
 The second statistically significant variable is the date variable (p = 0.017, t = -
2.55). The coefficient for the date variable is positive, which means that a later date is 
associated with a smaller abnormal negative return for a portfolio. The result implies that 
as the occurrence of restatement announcements becomes more frequent, the effect of 
each of them on its respective industry portfolio becomes smaller. The remaining 
variables - number of firms in a portfolio, HHI scores of the industry and dominance 
level of the announcing firm - are not statistically significant. 
We get a more robust model when we incorporate a dummy variable which 
distinguishes between the subsample of cases where the HHI score and the dominance of 
the announcing firm are both low (see figure 4 for regression results). The fund and date 
variables have the same signs as they had in the previous models; the sign for the new 
dummy variable is positive, confirming that the abnormal return is less negative for less 
dominant firms in industries that are not concentrated.  
 
Figure 3: Weighted Least Squares Regression Analysis (dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal returns on industry portfolios. Independent variables are fund size of the class action suit 
settlement, date, number of firms in the portfolio (logged), percentage of market capitalization of the 
announcing firm, and the Herfindahl-Hirschmanindex score of the industry. The weights are the residual 
standard deviations of industry portfolios during estimation period). 
Weighted analysis using weights in Stdev 
 
The regression equation is 
Portfolio -1,0 1 = 0.86 + 0.00188 Date - 0.94 log HHI - 0.0176 %marketcap 
           - 0.0191 Fund - 0.257 log firms 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant        0.864       7.853       0.11    0.913 
Date        0.0018822   0.0007384       2.55    0.017 
log HHI        -0.943       2.156      -0.44    0.665 
%marketc     -0.01757     0.05006      -0.35    0.728 
Fund        -0.019111    0.009508      -2.01    0.054 
log firm      -0.2573      0.7064      -0.36    0.718 
 
S = 2.670       R-Sq = 27.3%     R-Sq(adj) = 14.3% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source            DF          SS          MS         F        P 
Regression         5      74.838      14.968      2.10    0.095 
Residual Error    28     199.535       7.126 
Total             33     274.373 
 
 
Figure 4: Weighted Least Squares Regression Analysis (dependent variable is cumulative 
abnormal returns on industry portfolios. Independent variables are fund size of the class action suit 
settlement, date, and a 1/0 variable that distinguishes between a subsample of cases in which the HHI 
scores and the dominance of the announcing firm are both low, and the rest of the sample. The weights are 
the residual standard deviations of industry portfolios during estimation period). 
Weighted analysis using weights in Stdev 
 
The regression equation is 
Portfolio -1,0 1 = - 3.29 + 1.98 small HHI small % + 0.00186 Date - 0.0176 Fund 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef          T        P 
Constant      -3.2878      0.6333      -5.19    0.000 
small hh       1.9809      0.8871       2.23    0.033 
Date        0.0018553   0.0006429       2.89    0.007 
Fund        -0.017620    0.008191      -2.15    0.040 
 
S = 2.400       R-Sq = 37.0%     R-Sq(adj) = 30.7% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source            DF          SS          MS         F        P 
Regression         3     101.558      33.853      5.88    0.003 
Residual Error    30     172.815       5.760 
Total             33     274.373 
 
 
 
 
 
VI Summary and Conclusion 
We provide empirical evidence of intra-industry information transfer in cases of 
earnings restatements. On average, industry peers of announcing firms experience 
significant negative abnormal returns around the announcement day. The sample used, 
however, consists of cases in which the announcing firm was later sued, and settled the 
claim. This implies that a contagion effect occurs in earnings restatement cases which are 
significant enough to elicit a law suit. Further research is needed to determine whether 
other earnings restatements also cause a contagion effect.  
Our analysis of industry and firm characteristics shows that the dollar loss to the 
announcing firm’s shareholders, represented by the size of the settlement fund, has an 
important contribution to the contagion effect. We further find that for the period of our 
sample, the contagion effect became smaller with time, indicating that such events 
become less surprising. Finally, the contagion effect is smaller when the industry 
concentration level is small and the announcing firm constitutes a smaller percentage of 
the industry.    
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